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The Overturning of Quill and the New Nexus Standard
Ethan T. Kirner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Online retailers such as Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) consistently
battle with state governments over the collection of sales and use tax.
Although Amazon has historically not collected tax on its sales since
its founding in 1995, it decided in early 2017 to collect taxes in the
forty-five states that currently have a sales tax.1  This, however, did
not end the problem because there is a loophole that Amazon has
been able to use to its benefit.  Amazon currently only collects tax on
sales of inventory in which it owns, otherwise known as first-party
sales.2  First-party sales make up over half of the goods sold on Ama-
zon.3  The other half of Amazon’s sales are from merchandise owned
by other sellers, which are known as third-party sales.4  There are two
million merchants that use Amazon as a platform to make their sales.5
Amazon leaves the responsibility of collecting the tax on the millions
of individual merchants, but many of them are unaware of this re-
quirement and therefore, the tax is left uncollected.6
Third-party sellers that have been eluding the collection of sales tax
on their transactions have been given a significant price advantage, as
much as 10% in certain cases, over brick-and-mortar retailers and
products that are directly owned and sold by Amazon.7  In looking to
find additional revenue to make up for significant deficits, many states
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1. Wolf Richter, A Key Advantage Amazon Has Over Walmart is Doomed, BUS. INSIDER





6. Nick Wingfield, Amazon Sellers Brood as States Come Calling for Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/technology/amazon-sales-tax.html.
7. Laura Stevens, Next Target for States Seeking to Collect Sales Taxes: Sellers on Amazon,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-target-for-states-seeking-to-col
lect-sales-taxes-sellers-on-amazon-1490866207.
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would like to rely upon the collection of  tax from many of these e-
commerce sales that take place over online marketplaces such as Am-
azon.  To give an idea of how much money states lose every year, the
National Conference of State Legislatures estimates that states lost
out on $17.2 billion in revenue in 2016 because they were unable to
collect sales tax on many online sales.8  In efforts to try and recover
some of this lost revenue, many states have sought or are considering
measures that aim to force companies like Amazon and eBay to start
collecting tax on its third-party remote sellers.9  There is much criti-
cism surrounding this issue, which stems from the belief that new tax
collection requirements on third-party remote sellers located outside
the state will likely create logistical headaches.  These logistical issues
occur because the parties effected are often small businesses that are
not always able to track where their goods are held and sold.10
One of the reasons why states have struggled with this issue stems
from a Supreme Court case, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which disal-
lowed states from forcing companies to collect sales taxes if a com-
pany did not have a physical presence in the state.11  Because Amazon
has built many distribution centers and warehouses throughout the
country in an attempt to allow its customers to save money and re-
ceive quicker shipping, Amazon has developed a physical presence in
many states. This has prompted Amazon to start collecting sales tax in
those states under the physical presence doctrine which was affirmed
in Quill.12  However, because the e-commerce marketplace and vari-
ous selling platforms available today could not have been predicted by
the Supreme Court in 1992, the problem of how to treat third party
remote sellers who do not have a physical presence in the states in
which they sell still remains.
This article will discuss: the legal history behind sales tax on mail-
order and e-commerce platforms; the history of Amazon and their
sales tax issues with states; the recent efforts by states to close the
sales tax loophole that Amazon and other e-retailers have taken ad-
vantage of; and the impact states’ efforts will have on smaller busi-
nesses who use Amazon and other e-retail platforms for their
businesses.  One of the main questions that will need to be addressed
is whether the benefits of added state revenues outweigh the negative
8. Richter, supra note 1.
9. Stevens, supra note 7.
10. Richter, supra note 1.
11. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
12. Richter, supra note 1.
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externalities that small businesses may face if forced to collect the tax
on their own.
Section II will discuss sales tax history and the cases that have
shaped sales tax law.  Section III will discuss the growth of the online
market, particularly Amazon.  Section IV will discuss responses from
the states.  Section V will discuss federal legislative efforts.  Section VI
will discuss the efforts of overturning the Quill decision.  Finally, Sec-
tion VII will discuss the ramifications of overturning the physical pres-
ence doctrine established in Quill.
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW
There is no federal sales tax in the United States, rather each state
creates its own sales tax laws.  Currently, forty-five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia levy general sales taxes to all goods and certain ser-
vices, each with varying rates and exceptions on certain items.13
When a state seeks to implement a sales tax there are constitutional
requirements that must be met relating to the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause.  First, under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, no state shall “deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law”.14  The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to mean that states are pro-
hibited from taxing a corporation unless there is a “minimal connec-
tion” between the company and the state in which it operates.15
Second, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Con-
gress is authorized to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among several States.”16 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Commerce Clause to mean that states are prohibited from enacting
laws that might unduly burden or inhibit the free flow of commerce
between the states.17  In summary, the Due Process Clause requires a
definitive link or minimum connection between the state and the
transactions that it seeks to tax.18  The Commerce Clause requires a
higher level of connection that includes a substantial presence in the
13. How to State and Local Taxes Work?, TAX POLICY CTR., http://www.taxpolicycente.org/
briefing-book/how-do-state-and-local-sales-taxes-work (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. Monika Miles, Commerce Clause, Due Process and Quill Corp, SALES TAX SUPPORT,
http://www.salestaxsupport.com/sales-tax-information/sales-tax-101/commerce-clause-due-pro
cess-and-quill-corp/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Miles, supra note 15.
18. What is Nexus?, SALES TAX INST., www.salestaxinstitute.com/Sales_Tax_FAQs/What_is_
nexus (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
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taxing state.19  Over the years, the Supreme Court has shaped the in-
terpretation of these requirements and their application to sales
taxes.20
As applied to taxation, the Supreme Court ruled in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady that the taxpayer must have substantial nexus
with the taxing state in order for the state to impose a tax.21  Complete
Auto established that the Court will sustain a tax so long as the tax (1)
applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)
is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; and (4) is fairly related to the services that the state provides.22
Since Complete Auto, the Supreme Court has required that a taxpayer
have a physical presence in a state in order to be required to collect
and remit state sales or use tax.  In e-commerce, the state where the
buyer takes possession of the item is considered the location of the
sale.23  With regard to online retailers, this means that a state cannot
require them to collect sales tax unless the online retailer has a physi-
cal presence in the state, such as an office, an employee, or a ware-
house.24  The sufficient nexus approach was further developed
through a series of Supreme Court cases that were decided long
before the rapid development of the e-commerce market.  With the
emergence and dominance of the internet and e-commerce platforms,
states have implemented or proposed legislation going directly against
Supreme Court precedent. Through their efforts, the Supreme Court
has since reevaluated the law and overturned the physical presence
doctrine which was established and affirmed through the following
cases.
A. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson
In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, the Supreme Court decided whether a
Georgia retailer, that did not have offices located in Florida, was re-
quired to collect tax on sales made in Florida.25  Scripto did not have a
physical office in the state, but it would solicit orders from customers
in Florida by using specialty brokers that it employed as independent
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
22. Id. at 279.
23. Jennifer Dunn, Should You Use Billing Addressor Shipping Address When Calculating
Sales Tax?, TAXJAR (May 9, 2016), https://blog.taxjar.com/use-billing-address-shipping-address-
calculating-sales-tax/.
24. Sales Tax Guide For eCommerce Sellers, TAXJAR (June 14, 2016), https://www.taxjar.com/
guides/intro-to-sales-tax/#determining-sales-tax-nexus.
25. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1960).
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contractors who were Florida residents.26  Because of these brokers’
activities in the state, Florida ordered Scripto to register as a dealer
under its state tax statute.  Scripto challenged the statute as unconsti-
tutional by claiming that it violated the Due Process Clause and un-
justly burdened interstate commerce.27
The Court held that Scripto’s use of specialty brokers in Florida was
sufficient to subject them to tax collection.28  The Court recognized
that even though the specialty brokers were not actual employees of
Scripto, the distinction between an employee and an independent con-
tractor was constitutionally insignificant in determining whether or
not the physical presence requirements were met to impose a tax.29
Justice Clark argued that if the Court were to allow this distinction, it
would open up the flood gates for tax avoidance techniques.30  Ac-
cording to the Court, the functional reality was that Scripto had a real
presence in Florida and had purposefully reached out through their
brokers, even though they were not employees of the company.31
Scripto ultimately established that when the Supreme Court is discuss-
ing tax cases under the Due Process and Commerce Clause, it will
care more about the function or substance of the presence rather than
the form.32  The Court next addressed the nexus requirement issue for
sales tax seven years later regarding a mail-order company.
B. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois
In a 1967 case, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
of Illinois, the Supreme Court addressed whether a mail-order com-
pany was required to collect taxes in the states in which it sold prod-
ucts in.33  In Bellas Hess, the Court held the Illinois Department of
Revenue did not have the power to collect sales taxes from residents
of Illinois in which Bellas Hess sold products because Bellas Hess did
not have a distribution center, warehouse, office, or sales representa-
tive in the state.34
26. Id.
27. Id. at 207-08.
28. Id. at 211-12.
29. Scripto, Inc., 362 U.S. at 211.
30. Id.
31. Chris Atkins, Important Tax Cases: Scripto v. Carson and the Agency Theory of Nexus,
TAX FOUND. (Aug. 25, 2005), https://taxfoundation.org/important-tax-cases-scripto-v-carson-and-
agency-theory-nexus/.
32. Id.
33. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
34. Id. at 760.
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Bellas Hess was a mail order company that was only licensed to do
business in Delaware and Missouri.35  Further, it did not employ a
sales person or agent within Illinois.36  In contrast, Illinois argued that
by sending advertising flyers and catalogues to past, present, and po-
tential customers in Illinois, Bellas Hess was subject to tax in that
state.37  Bellas Hess claimed that by requiring it to be subject to its
taxing authority, Illinois violated the Due Process Clause and uncon-
stitutionally burdened interstate commerce.38  The Court found that
the minimal advertising was insignificant and insufficient to hold Bel-
las Hess liable for collection of the tax because the only contacts that
Bellas Hess had with Illinois was through common carrier or U.S.
mail.39  The physical presence doctrine was ultimately affirmed
twenty-five years later in a case that became the main law on the sales
tax subject until it was overturned by the Supreme Court in 2018.
C. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
The Court revisited the sufficient nexus issue twenty-five years later
in its 1992 decision Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.40  The Supreme
Court held that a physical presence is required to impose sales and use
taxes on out-of-state, or remote sellers.41  In Quill, North Dakota at-
tempted to tax Quill, a Delaware company that shipped office equip-
ment and supplies to customers in North Dakota.42  Quill did not have
any offices, warehouses, or employees in North Dakota.  Quill did,
however, solicit sales from customers in North Dakota through cata-
logs and advertisements, and all of its deliveries were done by mail or
common carrier.43
A North Dakota statute required retailers who solicited in the state
to collect sales taxes from sales to North Dakota customers and remit
the taxes back to the state.44  Quill refused to pay the taxes after
North Dakota filed an action in state court, which compelled Quill to
pay taxes on sales made to North Dakota residents.  Quill contended
the North Dakota statute violated the Due Process and the Com-
35. Id. at 753-54.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 755.
38. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
39. Id.
40. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
41. Id. at 317.
42. Id. at 302.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 302-03.
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merce Clause because Quill had not established sufficient nexus
within the state.45
The Court held a substantial nexus between North Dakota and
Quill did not exist in order to justify the collection of the tax.46  In
particular, the Court determined due process may be satisfied even if
the entity is not present physically in the state.47  This means “if a
foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an eco-
nomic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s
personal jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.”48
Therefore, the Court held Quill’s advertising activities sufficiently met
the Due Process Clause nexus requirement.49  Under the Commerce
Clause requirement, however, a corporation’s requirement to collect
tax does not turn on minimum contacts as it does under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.  Instead, it turns on an actual physical presence in the
taxing state.50  Therefore, because Quill did not have a physical pres-
ence in the state such as a sales force, plant, or office, it failed the
physical presence test under the Commerce Clause.  Thus, Quill also
ultimately failed the substantial nexus requirements that would be
needed for North Dakota to collect the tax.51
This decision affirmed the decision in Bellas Hess where the Court
upheld that substantial nexus exists only where there is a non-trivial
physical presence in the state.  Today, after serving as Supreme Court
precedent for twenty-five years, the Quill decision is no longer good
law.  After much controversy surrounding the decision given the rapid
advancement in e-commerce, many states have passed legislation that
defies the Quill decision by requiring a business to collect tax on their
sales, even if the person or business has no physical presence in the
state.  Through these state efforts, the issue was able to make its way
back to the Supreme Court in 2018, where the physical presence stan-
dard was ultimately overturned.  This decision and its ramifications
will be discussed later in this article.  Advancements in the e-com-
merce market, particularly those of Amazon, likely had the greatest
influence over the physical presence doctrine’s upheaval.
45. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 303.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Id. at 307.
48. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewics, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985): “So long as a
commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdic-
tion here.”).
49. Id. at 308.
50. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315.
51. Id. at 314-15.
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III. THE GROWTH OF AMAZON AND THE ONLINE MARKET
As previously discussed, Quill had been the standard for mail-order
retailers and companies that operate over the internet for many years.
When Quill was decided, the internet was not as advanced as it is to-
day.  The Quill decision was certainly influential in the creation of
Amazon.52  Exploiting the sales-tax loophole that was created in Quill
was definitely on the mind of Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon,
when he started the company in 1995, three years after Quill reaf-
firmed the physical presence doctrine.53  Bezos knew that a physical
location would be crucial to the success of his online business.54  In
discussing his rationale for an initial headquarters for Amazon, Bezos
stated:
In the mail-order business, you have to charge sales tax to custom-
ers who live in any state where you have a business presence.  It
made no sense for us to be in California or New York. . .I even
investigated whether we could set up Amazon.com on an Indian
reservation near San Francisco.  This way we could have access to
all the talent without all the tax consequences.55
Taking sales tax considerations in mind, and eventually deciding on
a headquarters located in Seattle, Bezos allowed early customers to
avoid state and local taxes that amounted to pricing advantages in the
retail market of as much as 10%.56  To take advantage of the physical
presence loophole in Quill, Amazon located its early fulfillment cen-
ters in states with a small population or no sales tax.57  This allowed
Amazon to enjoy a competitive advantage over physical retailers be-
cause it was able to keep its prices lower compared to brick and mor-
tar retailers such as Wal-Mart and Best Buy.58
Since 2011, however, Amazon has begun to focus more extensively
on providing the fastest possible delivery system to its customers, and
less on reducing its physical presence.59  In order to make delivery
times as fast as possible, Amazon has established a physical presence
in many states by building fulfillment centers close to almost every
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major U.S. city.60  Through its expansion, Amazon may have given up
its tax advantage.  This expansion strategy, however, has included the
company receiving massive tax subsidies from states that allow it to
build facilities.61  States have been willing to give up collecting taxes
from Amazon in exchange for Amazon’s promise to create jobs
through their distribution centers and warehouses.
In 2017, Amazon started the year with a commitment to expand its
rapid-delivery business model, and many states offered their support.
In less than three months, the company had received $92 million in tax
credits62 and exemptions to create warehouses and fulfillment centers
in California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and Michigan.63  Some of
the more recent deals include $43 million in tax credits for a facility
built in Baltimore, $32.1 million in tax credits for a facility in Wiscon-
sin, and $29.5 million in credits for a facility in Illinois.64  In rational-
izing these tax incentives, Amazon has emphasized its success as a job
creator.65
Recently, U.S. cities have offered Amazon billions of dollars in tax
breaks if it chooses to locate its second headquarters in their city.66
Many city officials are excited at the opportunity of Amazon’s $5 bil-
lion-plus investment and up to 50,000 new jobs that will come with the
company’s new headquarters.67  In particular, city and state leaders
from Illinois have offered incentives of around $2 billion or more in
order for Amazon to call Chicago its next home.68  In total, Amazon
received 238 bids from various cities69  It had ultimately settled on
New York City and Virginia to be home to its second headquarters,
60. Id.
61. Michael J. Bologna, Amazon Close to Breaking Wal-Mart Record for Subsidies, BNA
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/amazon-close-breaking-n57982085432/.
62. A tax credit reduces tax liability dollar-for-dollar, as opposed to a tax deduction, which
lowers taxable income.
63. Bolgna, supra note 61.
64. Bolgna, supra note 61.
65. Bolgna, supra note 61.
66. Jeffrey Dastin, Billions in Tax Breaks Offered for Amazon Second Headquarters,
REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-headquarters/billions-
in-tax-breaks-offered-to-amazon-for-second-headquarters-idUSKBN1CO1IP.
67. Id.
68. Monique Garcia & Bill Ruthhart, Illinois, Chicago Letter to Amazon: $2 Billion in Tax
Breaks, Maybe More, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
politics/ct-met-illinois-amazon-tax-incentives-20171023-story.html.
69. Nick Wingfield, Amazon Chooses 20 Finalists for Second Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/technology/amazon-finalists-headquarters.html.
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but has since withdraw its plans on New York City after political pres-
sure from local politicians.70
Amazon is no stranger to engaging with governments for tax incen-
tives.  Since 2000, Amazon has garnered approximately $1 billion in
subsidies.71  The growth of Amazon coupled with the shift in consum-
ers turning to the e-commerce market over the last twenty years can-
not be understated in its relation to efforts to overturn the physical
presence doctrine.  The expansion of the e-commerce market, aided in
large part by Amazon, has caught the attention of states as well as the
current presidential administration.
The retail market’s shift from brick-and-mortar stores to the online
market is increasingly evident.  The U.S. Commerce Department re-
ported that online sales reached $453.46 billion in 2017, a 16% in-
crease from the previous year.72  This is the largest growth since 2011,
when online sales grew 17.5% over 2010.73  It should come as no sur-
prise that much of the growth in the online retail market is attributed
to Amazon, which accounted for 44% of U.S. e-commerce sales in
2017.74  Amazon’s e-commerce sales are expected to be up nearly
30% in 2018, resulting in a capture of nearly half of the U.S. e-com-
merce market.75  A large factor in this growth is the result of sales
generated from the Amazon marketplace, which are forecasted to be
more than 70% of Amazon’s overall e-commerce business by the end
of 2019.76  In  2018, Amazon experienced its most successful holiday
season, which included millions of new Prime Memberships and a re-
cord breaking number of sales.77  Amazon is the leader of the e-com-
merce marketplace and its dominant share of the market is only
increasing with each year.  As states struggle to collect tax on e-com-
merce sales, the growth of Amazon and similar e-commerce market-
70. Lauren Feiner, Amazon says it will not build a headquarters in New York, CNBC (Feb. 14,
201 11:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/14/amazon-says-it-will-not-build-a-headquarters-
in-new-york-after-mounting-opposition-reuters-reports.html.
71. Pat Garofalo, Don’t Play Amazon’s Tax-Break Game, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 8, 2017), https://
www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-09-08/dont-give-amazon-tax-
breaks-for-its-new-headquarters.
72. Stefany Zaroban, US E-commerce sales grow 16.0% in 2017, DIGITAL COMMERCE 360
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/us-ecommerce-sales/.
73. Id.
74. Lauren Thomas and Courtney Reagan, Watch out, retailers. This is just how big Amazon is




77. Dennis Green, Amazon announces record-breaking holiday sales with more orders than
ever, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 26, 2018, 8:46 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-holiday-
sales-broke-records-company-says-2018-12.
2019] OVERTURNING OF QUILL AND THE NEW NEXUS STANDARD 49
places has certainly been influential in their efforts to create
legislation to address the problem.
Amazon is a drastically different business from when it first began
in 1995, and through its rapid expansion and market dominance, it has
actually moved towards supporting federal legislation to address the
issue of online sales taxation.78  The reason for Amazon’s support of
legislation is likely because Amazon is already required to collect tax
in most states because of its warehouses and shipping centers through-
out the country.79  The legislation that Amazon has supported, how-
ever, does not address the loophole that has benefited third-party
merchants.
This tax loophole, which many businesses might not know they are
taking advantage of, seems to be over.80  Commenting on the loop-
hole, Minnesota Senator Roger Chamberlain stated, “[i]t’s a fairness
issue.  Right now, there’s an unlevel playing field that disadvantages
brick-and-mortar stores.”81  President Trump also commented on the
issue in August of 2017, stating that Amazon was causing “great dam-
age to tax paying retailers.”82  Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin
also commented on Amazon’s sales tax practices by stating:
So this is an issue that we’ve been looking at very carefully within
the administration and we expect to come out with a position
shortly.  I am encouraged that Amazon is now charging tax, I be-
lieve, on their own sales but not the marketplace.  I’m not sure I
understand the consistency on that, but I respect the states’ ability
that there’s an awful lot of money that’s not being collected.83
To further indicate the administration’s views, President Trump con-
tinues to have a long-standing feud with Amazon and its founder Jeff
Bezos, who owns the Washington Post.  President Trump has consist-
ently attacked Bezos, who he once claimed is “using the Washington
78. Lauren Thomas, Amazon Celebrates ‘Biggest Holiday’ as Prime Members Surge, CNBC
(Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/26/amazon-celebrates-biggest-holiday-as-prime-
members-surge.html.
79. Brad Plumer, Here’s What Amazon Lobbies for in D.C., THE WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/08/06/heres-what-amazon-lobbies-for-in-d-
c/?utm_term=.cefc177d29c8.
80. Thomas, supra note 78.
81. Thomas, supra note 78. Minnesota became the first state to enact “Marketplace Sales
Tax” legislation, which would hold marketplace providers like Amazon responsible to collect
sales tax on behalf of their third-party sellers. See Minn. Stat. 297A.66.
82. Thomas, supra note 78.
83. Tae Kim, Treasury Secretary Comments on Amazon’s Tax Practices in Sign Trump May Be
Taking Aiming at Bezos, CNBC (July 26, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/26/mnuchin-com
ments-on-amazons-tax-practices.html.
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Post for power so that politicians in Washington don’t tax Amazon.”84
Making his views on the issue evident, President Trump recently
stated that, “they’re going to have to start paying sales tax because it’s
very unfair what’s happening to our retailers all over the country that
are put out of business.”85  Therefore, the question then seems to be-
come not whether tax changes on online sales are coming, but how
they will be implemented and how they will ultimately impact smaller
online businesses and those who rely on the Amazon marketplace to
make a living.  Over the last decade many states have attempted to
address the issue.
IV. STATE RESPONSES
The physical presence doctrine affirmed by Quill has made it diffi-
cult for states to collect sales tax revenue from online sales.  In recent
years, states have enacted laws, often called “Amazon laws” to ad-
dress the issue.  These laws seek to capture uncollected taxes on in-
ternet sales, while still complying with the Constitution’s
requirements.86  The two basic approaches that states have used are:
(1) click-through nexus statutes, which impose the responsibility for
collecting tax on those retailers who compensate state residents for
online referrals; and (2) requiring remote sellers to provide informa-
tion about sales and taxes to the state and customers.87  New York
became the first state to adopt a click-through nexus law, which pro-
vides that a seller is presumed to be a vendor if it entered into an
agreement with a resident of New York and the resident refers cus-
tomers to the vendor’s website.88  The law implemented a gross re-
ceipts threshold of $10,000 during the preceding quarterly periods.89
Amazon challenged the constitutionality of the law and the New York
Court of Appeals ultimately found that the law did not violate the
Commerce or Due Process Clause.90  As a result, Amazon has since
stopped its affiliate programs in many states.91
84. Brad Tuttle, Donald Trump’s Twitter Obsession with Amazon, Explained, TIME (Aug. 17,
2017), http://time.com/money/4904871/donald-trump-amazon-taxes-twitter-jeff-bezos/.
85. Teri Webster, Trump Leaning Toward Internet Sales Tax Because ‘It’s Very Unfair What’s
Happening to Retailers’, THE BLAZE (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.theblaze.com/news/2018/01/11/
trump-leaning-toward-internet-sales-tax-because-its-very-unfair-whats-happening-to-retailers.
86. Erika K. Lunder, “Amazon Laws” and Taxation of Internet Sales: Constitutional Analysis,
CONG. RES. SERV. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42629.pdf.
87. Id.
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As an additional alternative, many states have enacted legislation
requiring retailers that did not collect sales tax to notify customers of
their obligation to self-report and pay use tax, and to provide an an-
nual report to the state including the name, address, and total amount
of purchases to each of their customers.92  Notice and reporting legis-
lation, which was first enacted by Colorado, was quickly challenged as
being unconstitutional.93  The challenge involved a lengthy procedural
history in which the court of appeals had initially held that it was
barred from hearing the case by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) be-
cause the challenge sought to restrain the collection of sales and use
taxes.94  The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in which it
issued a unanimous decision in favor of the taxpayer.95  Justice Clar-
ence Thomas explained that Colorado’s enforcement of its notice and
reporting regime is not encompassed by the terms “levy, assessment,
or collection” as used in the TIA.96  On remand to the Tenth Circuit,
the court ultimately found the notice and reporting regime was not an
undue burden on taxpayers and that the Quill standard should not
apply because the Supreme found that the notice and reporting re-
quirements do not constitute a form of tax collection.97  Once it was
determined that the Colorado legislation was constitutional, many
states subsequently enacted their own reporting requirements.98
One of the greatest takeaways from the entire case was Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Directing Marketing Asso-
ciation v. Brohl (“DMA”), in which he expressed his frustration with
the Court’s 1992 decision in Quill.99  Kennedy stated that the Quill
Court “should have taken the opportunity to reevaluate Bellas Hess
not only in light of Complete Auto but also in view of the dramatic
technological and social changes that had taken place in our increas-
ingly interconnected economy.”100  Kennedy further stated that be-
cause of the Court’s previous decision, states have not been able to
92. Reporting Requirements-The Next Big Trend in Remote Seller Legislation, SALES TAX
INST. (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/reporting-requirements-the-
next-big-trend-in-remote-seller-legislation.
93. Id.
94. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013).
95. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
96. Id. at 1131.
97. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
98. Reporting Requirements-The Next Big Trend in Remote Seller Legislation, SALES TAX
INST. (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/reporting-requirements-the-
next-big-trend-in-remote-seller-legislation.
99. Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134-1135.
100. Id.
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collect many of the taxes due on mail and internet purchases.101  Ken-
nedy stated that a “case questionable even when decided, Quill now
harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated
earlier,” which has resulted in “extreme harm and unfairness on the
States.”102  Kennedy closed his opinion by stating that the legal system
should “find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and
Bellas Hess.”103  This call for an “appropriate case” certainly caught
the attention of states, who soon after sought to implement legislation
to address the issue.104
A majority of states have recently moved away from the click-
through and notice and reporting options.  Instead, they have insti-
tuted economic nexus policies in order to directly attack Quill.  Eco-
nomic nexus correlates with a select level of sales or gross receipts
activity within a particular state.105  A common economic nexus
threshold may be $100,000 of sales into a state or 200 or more transac-
tions within the state in a calendar year.106  If an out-of-state seller
who does not have physical presence in a state with economic nexus
legislation meets one of those conditions, they will be considered to
have nexus in the state and will be required to collect and remit sales
tax.107  The first state that sought to directly challenge Quill through
economic nexus was Alabama, whose regulation provided that out-of-
state sellers that lack an Alabama physical presence but that are mak-
ing retail sales of tangible personal property into the state exceeding
$250,000 per year have a substantial economic presence in Alabama
for sales and use tax purposes.108  Many states have subsequently
passed economic nexus legislation, but the most notable legislation
was passed by South Dakota in 2016.  South Dakota’s Senate Bill 106,
which will be discussed later in this article, obligated sellers with no
physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales tax if the
seller’s gross revenue exceeded $100,000 annually in the state or if the
seller conducted 200 or more separate transactions annually in the
state.109  South Dakota’s reason for this legislation is due to the state’s
101. Id. at 1135.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. David M. Vistica and Jeremy Sharp, Direct Marketing v. Brohl—Son of Quill?, DELOITTE
(Oct. 10, 2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-in
side-deloite-direct-marketing-brohl.pdf.




108. Ala. Admin. Code r. section 810-6-2-.90.03.
109. S.B. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
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inability to collect sales or use tax from remote sellers, which is erod-
ing the sales tax base of the state.110 The emergence of economic
nexus provisions were likely a result of Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in DMA, which offered an opportunity for the Supreme Court
to reevaluate the physical presence doctrine. Before the Supreme
Court could reevaluate the physical presence doctrine, however, cer-
tain states have attempted to collect sales tax from remote sellers in
the absence of economic nexus legislation.
For example, in June of 2017, South Carolina filed a complaint al-
leging that Amazon failed to collect sales taxes on sales made by
third-party sellers.111  South Carolina is claiming that for the first
quarter of 2016, Amazon owes $12.5 million in taxes, penalties and
interest, which they say will accrue until the matter is resolved.112
South Carolina is arguing that under state law, Amazon is considered
the seller because the company controls a large part of the sales pro-
cess for its third-party merchants.113  As previously mentioned, Ama-
zon handles the shipping and storing of many third-party sellers as
well as certain elements of the transaction such as payment processing
and customer support.114
Darien Shanske, a law professor at the University of California, Da-
vis, stated that South Carolina’s case is plausible because it seems
clear that Amazon and the state have more than a passive relation-
ship.115  Professor Shanske mentioned that Amazon will likely be
deemed responsible for tax collection if the state can prove the com-
pany is “sufficiently important” to helping out of state merchants
complete their sales within the state.116  He also mentioned that be-
cause third-party sellers are choosing Amazon for its particular setup
and benefits, it seems that there is a relationship that is similar to an
agent or an independent contractor.117  It is also expected that if
South Carolina were to be successful, that other states would likely
follow.118  Regarding these claims, Amazon stated in its quarterly
statement that “we believe the assessment is without merit,” but that
110. Gail Cole, Economic Nexus Trumps Affiliate Nexus, AVALARA (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.avalara.com/blog/2016/08/15/economic-nexus-trumps-affiliate-nexus/.
111. Eugene Kim, Amazon Faces a Tax Fight in South Carolina That Could Change How
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if South Carolina were successful “we would be subject to significant
additional tax liabilities.”119  This language seems to indicate that Am-
azon might be worried that a change may occur for its business.  South
Carolina’s resolution has been consistently delayed and is currently
set for a hearing before the state administrative law court in early Feb-
ruary 2019.120
Given these efforts by states to collect substantial revenues from
online sales, the implementation of economic nexus legislation has
been the most effective.  As previously stated, the state whose eco-
nomic nexus legislation has had the most impact is South Dakota’s,
whose case was heard by the Supreme Court in June of 2018 and led
to the overturning of the physical presence doctrine.  With the over-
turning of Quill, state taxing authorities seem to have been given un-
limited power.  As a result, proponents of federal legislation are
fearful that any attempt to implement federal legislation will be futile,
as states will likely oppose any legislation that would seek to limit the
new taxing authority that they have gained.121  Proponents of federal
legislation also feel that by Quill being overturned without legislation,
businesses would immediately be responsible for collecting and remit-
ting sales taxes throughout many states composing of approximately
10,000 different tax structures.122 Congress has failed in recent years
to pass legislation, and given the overturning of Quill, future action
remains uncertain.123
V. FEDERAL EFFORTS
Along with individual state efforts, federal proposals have been set
forth, but these proposals have ultimately failed to materialize.  In
April 2017, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Marketplace
Fairness Act of 2017 (“MFA”) to address the online sales tax issue.124
Very similar proposals were introduced in 2013 and 2015 but both
failed to be enacted.  This legislation would authorize states to require
remote sellers to collect state and local sales and use tax unless the
remote seller fell under the small seller exception, which is set at $1
119. Kim, supra note 111.
120. Andrew M. Ballard, Amazon’s Fight Against South Carolina’s Online Sales Tax Delayed,
BNA (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.bna.com/amazons-fight-against-n73014483093/.




124. Congress Introduces Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 and Remote Transactions Parity
Act of 2017, SALES TAX INST., https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/resources/congress-introduces-
marketplace-fairness-act-2017-and-remote-transactions-parity-act (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
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million on remote sales annually.125  If the act were to pass, online
sellers who make more than $1 million in remote sales per year would
be required to collect sales tax in states where they do not have a
significant physical presence.126  The $1 million exception refers to re-
mote sales, and not profits.  If passed, instead of collecting tax in only
the states in which a seller has nexus, they would also be required to
collect tax in states where they have no nexus.127  Under the MFA,
sellers would have to report how much sales tax was collected from
buyers in various states along with being required to file sales tax
every month in each of those states.128  This is likely to lead to admin-
istrative problems.
The MFA would also be troublesome for small businesses because
sales tax rules vary from state to state.129  According to the Tax Foun-
dation, there are around 10,000 sales tax jurisdictions in the United
States and the laws in each jurisdiction are problematic because they
all vary in interpretation of what is taxable.130  The burden of these
complexities would be impactful on small online retailers. Therefore,
it would be an advantage to larger online-retailers like Amazon.
Smaller online retailers would carry the burden of trying to apply the
online sales tax, which would require special software to understand
the sales tax rules of each state, and they would also likely have to hire
new employees to handle these sales tax issues.131  This would also
likely lead to a reduction in sales as consumers would look elsewhere
for lower prices.  This impact on smaller online retailers may be why
large online retailers have advocated for the passing of the MFA.
Companies like Amazon already have the infrastructure and man-
power to handle the complexities of the different sales tax require-
ments in each state.132  Passage of the MFA would ultimately be
unfair for smaller businesses and would likely not solve the problems
of growing deficits within the states.
125. Id.
126. Mark Faggiano, What Reintroduction of Internet Sales Tax Means for Online Sellers,
TAXJAR (May 4, 2017), https://blog.taxjar.com/internet-sales-tax-2017-online-sellers/.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Allen Johnson, Congress Should No Bring Back the Marketplace Fairness Act, CITIZENS
AGAINST GOV. WASTE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.cagw.org/thewastewatcher/congress-should-
not-bring-back-marketplace-fairness-act.
130. Jared Walczak, Scott Drenkard & Raymond Roesler, Sales Tax Rates in Major Cities,
Midyear 2017, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/sales-tax-rates-major-cit
ies-midyear-2017/.
131. Johnson, supra note 129.
132. Johnson, supra note 129.
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The Remote Transactions Parity Act (“RTPA”) of 2017 was also
introduced in April.  A similar piece of legislation was introduced in
2015 but failed to be enacted.  It is similar to the MFA and would
essentially create sales and use tax obligations for remote sellers with
a few differences and provisions.  The RTPA works on a tiered system
where online sellers who make $10 million or more in sales are sub-
jected to the law in the first year.133  Online sellers making $5 million
in sales or more are subject in the second year, and seller making
more than $1 million are subject in the third year.134  Under the
RTPA, however, all sellers who use a channel like Amazon or eBay,
regardless of their sales volume, would have to collect sales tax in re-
mote states.135  Because this Act would potentially open up small busi-
ness owners who make sales on online marketplaces to collecting tax
in all forty-five states, the law is effectively discouraging Americans
from operating businesses.  The RTPA was meant to make up for
some of the concerns regarding the MFA, but in the end, small busi-
nesses will be severely impacted by both options.  Therefore, it is
likely that these federal solutions will not pass any time soon.
VI. OVERTURNING QUILL
In 2018, Black Friday resulted in $6.22 billion in online sales, up
23.6 percent from a year ago.136  Cyber Monday sales were also ex-
pected to reach a record $7.8 billion in sales, up 18 percent from a
year ago.137  By comparison, mail order sales totaled approximately
$35.5 billion for the entirety of 1992 when the Quill decision was
made.138  Because of the continued rise of e-commerce sales, the costs
of the Quill decision will only keep increasing for states.  According to
market analysis, state and local governments stand to lose about $34
billion in revenue in 2018 because of the physical presence doctrine.139
The number of lost revenues is expected to also rise to $52 billion by
133. Faggiano, supra note 126.
134. Faggiano, supra note 126.
135. Mark Faggiano, New Internet Sales Tax Grab Decimates Channel Sellers, TAXJAR (June
18, 2015), https://blog.taxjar.com/new-internet-sales-tax-grab-decimates-channel-sellers/.
136. Lauren Thomas, Black Friday pulled in a record $6.22 billion in online sales: Adobe Ana-
lytics, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/24/black-friday-pulled-in-a-record-
6point22-billion-in-online-sales-adobe.html.
137. Id.
138. Gail Cole, Challenging Quill: What Started With North Dakota Could End With South
Dakota, AVALARA (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.avalara.com/blog/2017/11/27/challenging-quill-
started-north-dakota-end-south-dakota/.
139. David J. Herzig, States Pay the Price When You Buy Online, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/opinion/online-shopping-sales-tax.html.
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2022, a substantial increase from 1992 when losses were estimated to
be between $700 million and $3 billion.140
In response, South Dakota passed a senate bill 106 (“SB 106”) in
2016. This bill required businesses that made sales exceeding $100,000
annually over the internet or had 200 separate transactions within the
state to collect and remit sales tax even if they do not have a physical
presence in the state.141  South Dakota lawmakers purposely created
the law in order to give the Court another opportunity to overturn the
physical presence doctrine.142  The “Legislative Findings” even state
that the statute was designed to directly challenge Quill.143  To get
online retailers to comply with SB 106, the South Dakota Department
of Revenue sued four online retailers including Wayfair, Inc., Newegg
Inc., Overstock.com Inc., and Systemax Inc.144 The state admitted in
court filings that its remote sales tax statute is facially unconstitutional
under Quill but that its goal was to advance the case to the Supreme
Court in an effort to overturn the physical presence standard which
impedes it from collecting large revenues from online retailers not col-
lecting sales and use tax.  The Circuit Court sided with the retailers
and granted their motion for summary judgment, invoking the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, which prohibits a state from passing
laws that discriminate against interstate commerce.145 The Dormant
Commerce Clause is a tool that courts may apply to strike down state
laws that seem to impede cross-border trade when there is no explicit
guidance from Congress on the issue.  The South Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court’s opinion, deciding to follow Supreme
Court precedent.  This paved the way for the Supreme Court to revisit
the issue and ultimately grant certiorari, which they did in early
2018.146
140. Id.
141. Jennifer McLoughlin, Online Sale Tax Law Heads to South Dakota Supreme Court,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/online-sales-tax-n57982086318/.
142. Daniel Hemel, The Supreme Court Didn’t See E-Commerce Coming, SLATE (Sept. 18,
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143. Matt Mock & Laura Grace Mezher, The Possible Upshot of South Dakota’s Master Plan
to “Kill Quill”, SALT SAVVY (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.saltsavvy.com/2016/12/28/the-possible-
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A. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.
1. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In its decision decided on June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court over-
ruled the physical presence rule of Quill.147  The majority, led by Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy, and joined by Justices Clarence Thomas,
Samuel Alito, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Neil Gorsuch, began by dis-
cussing the history of the Commerce Clause as well as the history of
the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause148 jurisprudence.149  The
Court further determined that the two principles that guide courts in
all cases challenging state law (including the validity of state taxes)
under the Commerce Clause are: (1) that state regulations may not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and (2) that States may not
impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.150  A state law, which
discriminates against interstate commerce, is per se invalid. If the state
law, however, regulates even-handily to effectuate a legitimate local
interest, then it will be upheld unless the burden imposed is excessive
in relation to local benefits.151  After explaining the history of the
Court’s state tax Dormant Commerce Clause decisions in Bellas Hess,
Complete Auto, and Quill, the majority stated that the physical pres-
ence rule was an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause and
that the physical presence rule was incorrect given the economic ad-
vancements since Quill.152
2. Quill is Flawed on Its Own Terms
The Court stated Quill is flawed on its own terms because: (1) the
physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the require-
ment of substantial nexus; (2) the physical presence rule creates rather
than resolves market distortions; and (3) the physical presence rule
imposes an arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the modern Com-
merce Clause precedents disavow.153  In determining that the physical
presence rule is not necessary for substantial nexus, the court relied
on its decision in Quill, which rejected the physical presence rule for
due process purposes but not for Commerce Clause purposes.  The
147. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018).
148. The Dormant Commerce Cause, although not a part of the Constitution, is used to pro-
hibit states from discriminating against interstate commerce or unduly burdening interstate com-
merce, even in the absence of federal legislation regulating the activity.
149. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 2090.
150. Id. at 2090-91.
151. Id. (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005); and Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
152. Id. at 2092
153. Id.
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Court stated that because there are significant similarities between
due process and Commerce Clause standards, there should not be any
difference between the two standards as they relate to whether physi-
cal presence is required to force out-of-state sellers to collect and re-
mit sales taxes.154  As a result, physical presence is not required to
create substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause.  The majority
disagreed with the idea that, absent the physical presence rule, the
administrative costs of having to comply with thousands of tax juris-
dictions would create an undue burden on interstate commerce.  The
Court stated that costs of compliance, especially in today’s modern
economy, are unrelated to whether the company has a physical pres-
ence in the State.155  For example, a small company that has a diverse
physical presence could be faced with high burdens of compliance,
while a large remote seller that had the ability to easily comply with
the requirements of multiple tax jurisdictions would not be faced with
any burden.  According to the Court, the physical presence rule is a
poor proxy for compliance costs of companies that make sales in mul-
tiple states.
The Court then explained how the physical presence rule creates
rather than resolves market distortions because the rule creates a “ju-
dicially created tax shelter” for businesses that limit their physical
presence in the state but sell their goods and services to the state’s
consumers.156  This practice, according to the Court, created an artifi-
cial competitive advantage that should be prevented.  The Court
stated the distortions caused by businesses trying to avoid tax collec-
tion could mean that the market may currently lack storefronts, distri-
bution points, and employments centers that would otherwise be
efficient or desirable.157  Therefore, rejecting the rule is essential to
ensure that the Court’s precedents did not create artificial competitive
advantages.
The majority explained how the Court’s Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence has “eschewed formalism” in favor of a fact-sensitive case-by-
case analysis, but that Quill gives different treatment to different busi-
nesses for arbitrary reasons.158  As justification, the Court explained
how the physical presence rule would tax a sale online by a retailer
located in the state, but would not tax a sale of the same item sold by
an out-of-state retailer that did not have a warehouse located in the
154. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 2093.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2094.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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state, even if the sale had nothing to do with the warehouse.  This
distinction, according to the Court, did not make sense and that as
long as state law avoids an effect that goes against the Commerce
Clause, that courts should not rely on anachronistic formalism to in-
validate it.159  The Court analyzed the physical presence rule in light
of the modern e-commerce market, of which the majority concluded
that the rule was “artificial in its entirety.”160  The Court stated it did
not see how an individual employee, or a warehouse creates substan-
tial nexus, but modern pervasive technology does not.  Between
targeted advertising and instant access to consumers by way of the
internet, a business has a meaningful in-state presence without actu-
ally having an in-state physical presence.  The Court found that they
should not maintain a rule that ignores substantial virtual connections
to the State.161  The Court also found the rule was unjust because it
essentially allows a remote seller’s customers to avoid paying sales
taxes of which are essential to create and secure the active market
they supply with goods and services.  According to the Court, Quill
harms federalism and free markets because the state’s ability to seek
prosperity is limited, and market participants are prevented from
competing on a level playing field.162
The majority also rejected upholding Quill based on stare decisis
because they did not believe that stare decisis would support the
Court’s prohibition of a valid exercise of the States’ sovereign
power.163  The Court determined that its Commerce Clause decisions
might prohibit the States from exercising their lawful sovereign pow-
ers, and that the Court should be vigilant in correcting that error.164
The majority also stated it would be wrong to ask Congress to resolve
the issue because it would be inconsistent with the Court’s proper role
to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise the Court
itself created.165  The majority dismissed the idea that the physical
presence rule was easy to apply, and that arguments for reliance based
on the physical presence rule’s clarity are misplaced.  The Court men-
tioned Massachusetts’s as well as Ohio’s attempts in recent years to
expand the rule by placing cookies on a computer of an in-state resi-
dent, and other arbitrary rules that more than likely result in large
159. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 2094-95.
160. Id. at 2095.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2096.
163. Id.
164. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 2096.
165. Id.
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amounts of litigation.166  Finally, the majority noted that Congress
could potentially resolve the problems associated with increased ad-
ministrative burdens that small businesses or others engaged in inter-
state commerce might face.  In conclusion, the majority held the
physical presence rule of Quill was “unsound and incorrect”.167
Therefore, Quill and Bellas Hess were overruled.168
3. Substantial Nexus Sufficiency Test
Besides overruling Quill and Bellas Hess, the Court also created a
new sufficiency test to determine if substantial nexus exists.  Accord-
ing to the majority, substantial nexus will be established “when the
taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of car-
rying on business’ in that jurisdiction.”169  This new standard was satis-
fied in Wayfair because of the economic and virtual contacts that the
remote sellers had with South Dakota.  The Court determined that the
large national companies involved in the case maintained an extensive
virtual presence with South Dakota, meaning that the substantial
nexus requirement of Complete Auto was satisfied.  The majority,
however, did not conclude that the entirety of South Dakota’s law was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.  Instead, the Court de-
cided to remand the case to the South Dakota Supreme Court in or-
der to determine whether the law violated another principle of the
Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine.  The Court did, however, note
that the South Dakota law contained several features that appear de-
signed to prevent discrimination or an undue burden on interstate
commerce.  These factors were: (1) the law contained a safe harbor for
those with limited business in South Dakota; (2) the law ensured that
no obligation to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively; and
(3) South Dakota is one of more than twenty states that have adopted
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, which standardizes
taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs.170
4. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.  Justice
Thomas explained how he should have joined Justice Byron R.
166. Id. at 2097-98. See 830 Code Mass. Regs. 64H.1.7 (2017) (Proposed regulation that would
have defined physical presence to include making apps available to be downloaded by in-state
residents and placing cookies on in-state residents’ web browsers.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 5741.01(I)(2)(i) (Adopting a similar standard to Mass.)
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2099.
169. Id. (citing Polar Tankers Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)).
170. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 2099-100.
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White’s dissenting opinion in Quill and how he believes that there is
no rational justified reason for the Court’s entire Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.171  Justice Gorsuch stated how the physical
presence rule was a “judicially created tax break” that the Court
lacked the authority to create, but he emphasized that his agreement
with the majority discussion of Dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence should not be interpreted as his agreement with all aspects of
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.172
In Justice Robert’s dissenting opinion, he agreed that Bellas Hess
was wrongly decided but that the Wayfair Court should not have de-
parted from the doctrine of stare decisis because Congress has the
power in the area of state and local taxation and could have overrid-
den the decision of Bellas Hess and Quill with new legislation.  Justice
Roberts was also concerned that the majority’s decision may cause
Congress to avoid consideration of the issue.  Further, Justice Roberts
raised issue with the majority’s focus on unfairness and injustice, but
not the public policy concerns of the Wayfair decision’s effect on the
economy. Justice Roberts was ultimately concerned that the decision
might alter the marketplace itself and that significant compliance costs
will be brought upon market participants.  Therefore, in his opinion,
Congress would be better suited to balance the many competing inter-
ests of the issue.173
5. The New Nexus Standard
The Wayfair decision left many unanswered questions.  Substantial
nexus after Wayfair turns on whether a taxpayer or retailer has
availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in the
taxing jurisdiction.  The Court in Wayfair, however, did not define
what the minimum threshold of this sufficiency test was.  Rather, it
chose to have the lower court determine if sufficient nexus was met.
The only guidance that states are given in determining the sufficiency
of the economic and virtual contacts are the contacts with South Da-
kota that the businesses in Wayfair had.  The issue is that the Court
did not adequately analyze those businesses’ contacts with the state.
The Court concluded that each of the businesses, by being large na-
tional companies, had an extensive virtual presence within South Da-
kota.  The Court left unanswered the question of what constitutes
something that is less than an extensive virtual presence, and whether
something less would also be sufficient to establish substantial nexus.
171. Id. at 2100.
172. Id. at 2100-01.
173. Id. at 2104-03.
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The Court raised the possibility that contacts such as substantial vir-
tual connections, targeted advertising, or instant access to most con-
sumers via any internet-enabled device may satisfy the new sufficiency
test.  Contacts that also meet the test may include such things as cook-
ies on an in-state customer’s computer, or a mobile app that is
downloaded on an in-state customer’s phone.  In the end, it is not
clear at all how the Court would like the lower courts to apply the new
sufficiency test that they have created, and there is no guidance that
taxpayers or retailers can rely on to determine whether they have sub-
stantial nexus with the state.  Because the Court did not reference the
other prongs of the Complete Auto test, it will be interesting to see
how South Dakota will determine whether the state statute satisfies
the requirements of the Commerce Clause.  Because the Wayfair
court did not provide any bright line rules for courts to determine
whether a state statute satisfies the requirements of the Commerce
Clause, courts will likely review the facts on a case-by-case basis, with
the assistance of the four factors that were identified in South Da-
kota’s law.
5. Post-Wayfair Congressional Action
The prospect for congressional action after Wayfair is slim. The suf-
ficiency test for substantial nexus will more than likely be found to be
favorable for states and localities.  Given that South Dakota sought to
have Quill overturned, the lower court will likely consider the new
standard constitutional on remand given that the Wayfair decision
seems to give states much deference in their tax collection power.
Given the amount of deference given to states, there will not be much
incentive to pressure Congress for clarification on the Wayfair deci-
sion.  As a result, states are more likely to lobby against any attempt
for congressional action.  On the opposite end, taxpayers, and specifi-
cally remote retailers (who may be subject to tax in up to 10,000 juris-
dictions) will have incentive to lobby congress to mitigate the added
and costly administrative compliance and tax burdens that will have
economic consequences as a result of Wayfair.
VII. CONCLUSION
The advancements in technology and the growth of online market-
places such as Amazon have certainly been the main factor in creating
a new sales tax landscape.  E-commerce has grown to a size today that
could not have been predicted when the physical presence standard
was established.  As a result, state tax revenues have declined because
of their inability to collect tax from online purchases.  A change was
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needed, and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in DMA opened
the door for the Court to make that change.  After twenty-five years,
the Court was given that opportunity, but it ultimately failed in creat-
ing new guidance going forward.  The lack of guidance given from the
Supreme Court is leaving many businesses and many states confused
on how they should proceed.  The fallout of the Wayfair decision is yet
to be determined, and many states are currently in the process, or
have recently reacted to the decision in order so that they may try to
stabilize their deficits.  The large on-line retailers brought the issue to
the forefront of the Supreme Court, but it will ultimately be smaller
businesses that suffer the consequences as they try and navigate the
new complex nexus standard.  Although the added revenue from addi-
tional sales tax will help state economies and infrastructure, consum-
ers and smaller businesses will likely be impacted the most, not large
corporations such as Amazon.  Although brick-and-mortar stores are
at a disadvantage, and tax policy ideally should treat all businesses
similarly, requiring remote online sellers to comply with tax laws and
reporting requirements of potentially 10,000 different jurisdictions be-
comes a logistical nightmare.  By having businesses comply with all
the different distinctions and requirements of each jurisdiction’s tax
code, many businesses will have to hire additional staff to comply,
which will further reduce their bottom line and potentially discourage
Americans from being business owners.  Therefore, going forward, it
would be helpful for large online marketplaces to handle tracking and
tax requirements for third-party sellers who use their marketplaces.
Finally, because the Supreme Court ultimately failed to define what
will make economic nexus laws constitutional, it would be in the best
interest of Congress to develop guidance that promotes fairness and
establishes a sufficient framework for states in light of Wayfair.
